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Abstract
One of the main objectives of transnational banking regulation over the past two decades
has been the standardization of regulatory practices and the allocation of regulatory powers
to minimize the regulatory burden for banks. The resulting division of labor between home
and host country regulators strongly favors Home over Host; And the regulatory scope
has continued to focus on entities rather than activities. This paper argues that this has
created several blind spots in transnational regulation of finance. First, Home is unlikely to
monitor and respond to risks that are unique to Host, even though they might emanate from
activities of banks that are subject to their consolidated regulatory supervision. Second,
Host, may have regulatory supervision over a subsidiary of Home’s parent company,
but may rely on Home to exert regulatory controls. Moreover, Host has little regulatory
leverage if the parent bank side-steps regulatory restrictions imposed on subsidiaries by
engaging in direct lending practices, or by channeling capital through entities that are
not subject to similar regulations. Second, the continued focus on entity based regulation
ignores the fact that the core function of banks, maturity transformation, is increasingly
performed by non-bank institutions that escape the existing transnational regulatory
framework. Against this background, this paper proposes effect-based regulation, which
gives Host the power to regulate any activity that has a systemic effect on its financial
system, irrespective of who undertakes it and where it is carried out. The paper uses the
recent example of Central and Eastern Europe during the global financial crisis to illustrate
the failure of the existing regime.
Keywords: EU banking regulation, financial crisis, transnational regulation, effect-based
regulation, systemic risk, home-host country regulation
JEL Classifications: F34, F55, G21, K2
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1. Introduction
Over the past two decades, the quest for integrating financial markets into
a single global marketplace has produced a host of legal and regulatory
measures aimed at taming national protectionism, easing access to
foreign markets, and lowering the regulatory burden for financial
intermediaries that operate trans-nationally. Based on commonly agreed
upon prudential standards, home country regulation and supervision has
become the core principle in the design of most regulatory structures. This
principle, first established as the “Basel Concordat” in a series of reports
issued by the Bank of International Settlement in Basel,2 has also informed
financial regulation in the EU: Indeed, the European passport system-which allows a financial intermediary that has been duly licensed in one
member state to offer financial services and establish branch offices in
other member states without requiring additional regulatory approval in the
host state—can be viewed as a strengthening of the home-host country
regulatory principle.
This paper questions the soundness of this principle as the primary means
for governing interdependent financial markets; it draws on the lessons
from the global financial crisis, which has exposed the vulnerability of host
countries’ financial system to regulatory abstinence by home countries of
trans-nationally operating financial groups. This problem has become

2

Note that the first “Report to the Governors on the supervision of banks’ foreign
establishments” of 1975 stresses cooperation and makes only general recommendations
for the allocation of supervisory authorities between home and host country. However, by
1983 the notion that the parent company’s home regulator would exercise consolidated
supervision over the banks’ worldwide operation, became well established. See
“Principles for the Supervision of Banks’ Foreign Establishments” (May 1983). Host
country regulators retained supervisory control over subsidiaries located in their countries
and were encouraged to prohibit the operation of a subsidiary in the event they deemed
regulatory oversight by the parent to be inadequate. Nonetheless, as anticipated by the
Principles, vesting consolidated supervision over the international banking group with the
parent has undermined host country supervision. All BIS documents are available at
www.bis.org.
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acute due to increasing financial interdependence: As emerging markets
in Eastern Europe and Latin America opened their borders to foreign
financial investors they have witnessed large parts of their financial
systems being taken over by foreign groups and capital channeled across
their borders.3 This in turn has exposed these host countries to risks
emanating from activities of these foreign financial groups. Even the UK—
with its long tradition of financial market development—has found itself at
risk from parent banks in Iceland with extensive branch and Internet
operations in the UK.4 In contrast, existing templates for transnational
financial regulation as embodied in EU law or the Basel Concordat are
primarily concerned with the opposite scenario—namely risks emanating
from a host country’s failure to regulate a subsidiary to the parent
company and its home market. Moreover, in a world of mobile capital,
entity-based regulation captures only a fraction of capital flows—which can
just as easily be channeled into direct lending, securities, or through
unregulated financial intermediaries as through intra-group relations
between parents and subsidiaries.
To address the new risk pattern of interdependent financial markets, this
paper advocates existing arrangements with bias in favor of home-country
regulators and a strong focus on entity-based regulation be supplemented
with effect-based jurisdiction. While there is still a need for consolidated
regulation of financial intermediaries that operate trans-nationally, the
global crisis has demonstrated that there is also a pressing need to

3

To be sure, the fact that liberalization of financial markets exposes the new destination
countries of foreign capital flows to the risk of financial crisis has been well established in
the literature. See Graciela L. Kaminsky & Carmen Reinhart The Twin Crises: The
Causes of Banking and Balance-of-Payment Problems, 89 American Economic Review,
473 (1999) and more recently Carmen Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff Is the 2007 U.S.
Sub-Prime Crisis so Different? An International Historical Comparison, Working Paper
Harvard Economics Department, (2008).

4

For details on this see The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global
Banking Crisis. UK Financial Services Authority (2009) at 39.
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address the systemic effects the operations of these intermediaries have
on markets other than their home country. Effect-based jurisdiction would
allow countries to regulate financial intermediaries that have a material
effect on their domestic financial markets irrespective of their domicile. I
suggest that such an arrangement might also instill the kind of cooperative
regulation of global financial markets that has so far eluded a regime that
favored home over host country regulators. The intuition for this claim is as
follows: Vesting host countries with effect-based regulatory powers
changes the balance of power between home- and host-country regulators
and increases the likelihood that interests of host countries will be heard
and incorporated into the home country regulator’s objectives. Effectbased host country regulation therefore does not necessarily multiply
regulatory oversight; In contrast, the prevailing home-host country
distribution of regulatory powers favors home country regulators and
leaves host country regulators without much leverage to ensure that
consolidated home regulators adequately account for the risks the growth
markets of financial intermediaries subject to their regulation face as a
result of their actions. I argue that effect-based regulation is also superior
to centralized regulation in the hands of a supranational European
regulator not only on grounds of political feasibility, but also as a matter of
efficacy; this strategy better aligns regulatory authority with the allocation
of costs in the event of regulatory failure. Moreover, it encourages greater
attention by global financial groups to the impact their actions may have
on the various domestic markets in which they operate: Should they wish
to avoid the scrutiny of multiple regulators they will need to stay below the
threshold that triggers effect-based regulation or incorporate the concerns
of host countries into their actions; Incidentally this can also be viewed as
a strategy for addressing the too-big-to-fail syndrome. Within the
European Union, such a regime will almost certainly require an
amendment of existing banking directives. De lege lata, only in exceptional
4

circumstances will member states be able to exert effect-based jurisdiction
in contravention of established home-host country regulatory structures on
grounds of public policy exceptions incorporated in the Treaty and relevant
directives (see infra Part 4).
The analysis is presented in four parts: Part 2 discusses the limitations of
home-host country regulatory divisions of labor in light of the global crisis,
Part 3 develops the principles of effect-based regulation and assesses its
likely impact on inter-regulatory cooperation drawing from experience with
other

regulatory

regimes

that

accommodate

multiple

overlapping

jurisdictions,. Part 4 analyzes the scope for effect-based jurisdiction within
existing EU law and offers some critique of proposals for reforming the EU
financial regulatory regime that are currently under discussion, Part 5
concludes.
2. Host’s Dilemma
Host—for the purpose of this paper—is defined as a medium-sized
country that has fully liberalized its financial markets. Three banks that are
domiciled in the neighboring country Home (thus, they exist as foreign
banks) own the majority of bank assets in Host. Host’s financial system
grows rapidly for a while thanks to the strategies pursued by banks from
Home:

Home’s

banks

acquired

local

banks

in

Host,

improved

management structures, transferred capital and expertise and developed
new markets—including consumer lending and corporate lending to firms
that hitherto had little access to external sources of finance. Eventually
regulators in Host suspect that the growth of the financial sector—
especially the pace of credit market expansion—might not be sustainable
and may well trigger a financial crisis. Host therefore attempts to slow the
expansion of credit by domestic financial intermediaries by imposing
higher reserve requirements and administrative ceilings on the permissible
credit volume per bank. To their surprise, they find that these measures
5

have little impact on the expansion of credits which continues almost
unabated; Investigations suggest that domestic banks licensed in Host
have by and large complied with the new restrictions, however, their
parents located in Home have chosen to channel new credits not through
them—i.e. their foreign subsidiaries—but instead to lend directly to
customers in Host; in addition, some parents have established leasing
companies and other vehicles that are not subject to Host’s banking
regulations and thus proved unresponsive to the imposed restrictions.
Regulatory authorities in Host inform Home’s regulators of these practices
invoking a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that sets forth principles
of home-host regulatory cooperation. Yet regulators in Home don’t share
Host’s concerns: They point out that the transnational banks located in
Home are well diversified with respect to the different markets they serve
(i.e. they have operations not only in Host, but in numerous other countries
throughout the region) and to the products they offer and they therefore
see no reason to intervene. Within weeks of this exchange, international
lending markets show severe signs of distress triggering a major
contraction of credit globally. Banks from Home find themselves unable to
raise capital on interbank lending markets to continue their expansive
strategies in Host; indeed, as global financial markets grind to a standstill
they cut back their lending activities—especially in foreign markets. Host
thus experiences substantial outflows of capital, which plunges its
economy into severe recession, forcing them to seek help from the IMF.
The above scenario has been couched in hypothetical terms, yet closely
resembles the experience of many Central and Eastern European (CEE)
countries—including virtually all new member states of the European

6

Union,5 where foreign financial groups dominate the domestic banking
systems; their assets comprise between 36 percent (Slovenia) and 97
percent (Estonia) of total bank assets.6 Banking systems are also highly
concentrated: As of 2005, the top five banks in key CEE countries had a
market concentration ratio7 ranging from 48 percent in Poland to 99
percent in Estonia:8 thus, a few foreign banking groups own most of the
banking sector in CEE countries. Even for the largest country among the
new member states of the EU—Poland—the importance of foreign owned
banks to the domestic economy is far greater than the importance of it’s
subsidiaries to the portfolio of the foreign bank that serves as its parent
company.9
The presence of foreign banks in Eastern Europe has greatly contributed
to the transformation of domestic financial markets and their catch-up with
more developed markets in Western Europe. Where as of 1998 financial
market development of most countries in CEE still lagged behind countries
at similar GDP levels10, in the early 2000s they reached—and sometimes

5

Slovenia and Slovakia have been least affected by the crisis, most likely because they
were already part of the Euro zone and therefore escaped the twin crisis syndrome of a
concurrent currency and banking crisis. However, it is also worth noting that as discussed
below, foreign bank in penetration in Slovenia has been substantially lower than
elsewhere.

6

Charles Enoch Credit Growth in Central and Eastern Europe, in The Causes and Nature
of the Rapid Growth of Bank Credit in the Central, Eastern and South-Eastern European
Countries), (Charles Enoch & Inci Ötker-Robe eds., 2007) at 3.

7

Calculated as the fraction of assets of the total banking system’s assets held by the five
largest domestic and foreign banks per country. See Andre Uhde & Ulrich Heimeshoff
Consolidation in banking and financial stability in Europe: Empirical evidence, 33 Journal
of Banking and Finance, 1299 (2009). The ECB confirms a high concentration ratio in
these countries. See ECB, Banking Structure in the New Member States (European
Central Bank, 2005).
8

Uhde & Heimeshoff supra note 7.

9

Piotr Bednarski & Dariusz Starnowski Home and Host Supervisors' Relations: A Host
Supervisor's Perspective, in Rapid Credit Growth in Central and Eastern Europe: Endless
Boom or Early Warning? (Charles Enoch & Inci Ötker-Robe eds., 2007).

10

See Katharina Pistor et al. Law and Finance in Transition Economies, 8 The
Economics of Transition, 325 (2000).

7

exceeded—these comparative benchmarks.11 What was remarkable and
yet proved to be unsustainable was the speed with which these changes
occurred. Within a period of only 5 years (from 2000 to 2005) the credit to
GDP ratio doubled, and even tripled in several countries.12 According to
Backe et al., “at the end of 2006, the annual growth rates of credit to the
private sector ranged from 17% to 64%”13 in Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia
and Slovenia.14 This data almost certainly understates the real growth of
credit, as it captures only credit expansion by domestic banks and
excludes direct cross-border lending by foreign banks to firms and
households in these countries.15
When finance in CEE countries dried up as a result of the global financial
crisis, their governments turned out to be unable to protect their financial
systems without outside help. The sudden stop of foreign capital inflows
followed by extensive capital outflows in 2008 and 200916 left the Host

11

This has been the case in Bosnia-Hezegowina and Croatia – two small countries that
are candidates for full members of the EU. See Figure 2.6 in Calin Arcalean et al. The
Causes and Nature of the Rapid Growth of Bank Credit in the Central, Eastern and
South-Eastern European Countries, in Rapid Credit Growth in Central and Eastern
Europe: Endless Boom or Early Warning? 13), (Charles Enoch & Inci Ötker-Robe eds.,
2007) at p. 22.

12

Enoch in, supra note 6.

13

Peter Backe et al. Credit Growth in Central and Eastern Europe Revisted § 2007
(Österreichische Nationalbank 2007).

14

In the United States, a country with a much larger and deeper financial system, credit
extended by commercial banks grew by about 11 percent in 2006. See Board of the
Federal Reserves, Monetary Report to Congress, 19 June 2006, at p. 22.

15

The Austrian National Bank published data in July 2009, that suggest that in the years
preceding the crisis direct lending as well as lending via unregulated intermediaries, such
as leasing companies, increased on average by 20 percent and by over 50 percent in the
newest member states of the EU (Bulgaria and Romania). See ONB, FinanzmarktStabilitätsbericht (Österreichische Nationalbank (Austrian National Bank) 2009): “… the
share of recipient intra-group FIs increased from 65% to more than 70% of total direct
credit to FIs. These growth rates are inter alia due to the growing importance of leasing
firms affiliated with Austrian firms.”

16

Prisoska Nagy “BIS Data on Cross-Border Flows – A Closer Look”, EBRD blog, 11 May
2009, available at www.ebrdblog.com.

8

system economies in freefall and brought their currencies under attack,17
and many countries were forced to turn to multilateral organizations for
help. The IMF has entered into emergency loans with Belarus, BosniaHerzegovina, Hungary, Latvia and Ukraine and has concluded standby
agreements with Poland and Romania. The European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) established a joint action
program together with the World Bank and the European Investment Bank
(EIB) in January 2009, committing €24.5 billion to support the banking
sector in the region. Additionally, the European Central Bank (ECB) has
reached out to central banks outside the euro area (Sweden, which has
become exposed to the downturn in the Baltic states where Swedish
banks have a strong presence, but also Poland and Hungary) to provide
additional liquidity.
The hypothetical scenario and its application to the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe illustrate the shortcomings of the prevailing regime for
governing transnational finance both within the EU and globally. First, it
suggests that the allocation of regulatory jurisdiction that is tied to a
particular from of intermediation—banking—is incomplete. Host-country
control over subsidiaries is effectively undermined by the ease with which
transnational financial groups can side-step regulatory controls imposed
on one vehicle (banks) by channeling capital through other vehicles
(leasing companies) or by engaging in direct-lending activities to
customers in foreign markets.18 Second, it ignores the potential for

17

Except for those countries in CEE that had already introduced the euro, i.e. Slovenia
and the Slovak Republic, these countries suffered a classic twin-crisis.

18

There are obvious parallels to this incompleteness of global financial regulation in
national regimes. The general trend for resolving this problem has been to move a way
from institution or entity based regulation (i.e. separate regulation for banks, insurance
companies, etc.) and to consolidate financial regulation in a single national regulator. See
Heidi Mandanis Schooner & Michael Taylor United Kingdom and United States
Responses to the Regulatory Challenges of Modern Financial Markets, 38 Texas
International Law Journal, 317 (2003) for a comparison of the UK and the US and

9

conflicts of interest between host- and home-country regulators as their
risk exposure to the activities of these banks diverges. In the above
example,

Home’s

regulators

were

concerned

primarily

with

the

diversification of their banks, but showed little interest in the systemic
effects the activities of these banks might have on the stability of the
foreign markets in which they operated. Yet, what might look like a growth
market to the parent bank and its regulators can take the form of a credit
boom and looming bust for regulators in the destination country of
seemingly benign financial flows.19 Third, the strategy is oblivious to the
fact that in a highly inter-dependent financial system contagion can spread
from anywhere (i.e. parent or subsidiary, home or host country) throughout
the entire system.20 Early detection and prevention should therefore be
paramount; however, this is difficult to achieve as host- and home-country
regulators have incomplete information21 the former because they do not
have access to information about activities of the parent bank that might

additional comparative evidence from Germany, Australia and Switzerland. The argument
developed in this paper suggests that consolidation may not be the right answer in all
cases. Incidentally, countries with consolidated regulators (UK or Switzerland) have not
faired much better in the crisis than the US with its byzantine governance structure.
19

See also Richard J. Herring Conflicts between Home & Host Country Prudential
Supervisors (2007) who illustrates this conflict of interest with the following “nightmare
scenarios” in which a foreign entity with a large share of local (i.e. host country) markets
becomes “systematically important, while at the same time, being so small relative to the
parent group that it is not regarded as significant to the condition of the parent company”;
in this case, the home country regulator may not see a case for intervention as it is
naturally concerned with the stability of the financial group for its’ own market, not with
the stability of the financial system of countries in which that group operates a subsidiary.

20

Allen and Gelb use a formal model to suggest that only a fully integrated, or complete,
financial system can avoid contagion problems of this kind. See Franklin Allen & Douglas
Gale Financial Contagion, 198 Journal of Political Economy, 1 (2000). For empirical
evidence compare Graciela L. Kaminsky et al. The Unholy Trinity of Financial Contagion,
17 Journal of Economic Perspectives, 51 (2003).

21

Under EU guidelines and Basel equivalents, host country regulators depend on home
country regulators for receiving relevant information. See, for example, the CEBS
Guidelines for Cooperation between Consolidated Supervisors and Host Supervisors, 25
January 2006, according to which the parent company in charge of consolidated regulator
has unfettered access to all relevant information; in contrast, “essential information and, if
deemed useful, relevant information is provided to all supervisors at an appropriate level”.
Ibid at 15.
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affect their markets; and the latter because they do not have sufficient
information about how the totality of activities of their banks might affect
foreign markets.
The described risk properties of inter-dependent financial markets call for
an approach to regulation other than the choice between home versus
host country regulation on one hand, or national vs. supra-national
regulators on the other. The choice between home and host country
regulation offers a wrong alternative where in fact both home and host
country regulation is required to fully take account of the different risks
associated with financial interdependence. Home country regulators will
focus on the stability of financial institutions—including financial groups
with regional or global reach in light of the repercussion their failure might
have on the home market; their interests are primarily entity-focused and
based on the assumption that the stability of the financial entity is strongly
correlated with the stability of the bank’s and the regulator’s home market.
Even if true, this correlation is not sufficient enough to protect the host
country, and it’s market may suffer from actions taken by parent banks
that may not have any repercussions for the stability of the parent or its
home market. Home country regulators have few incentives to fully
internalize these host-country specific risks, because they do not bear the
costs of a crisis in that country. Rather, a crisis in host countries can be
(and as the history of emerging market crises suggests22 typically is being)

22

This is true for the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s as well as the series of
emerging market financial crises of the 1990s from Mexico’s tequila crisis in 1994, to the
1997/8 East Asian financial crisis and the related crises in Russia and other former
socialist countries; as well as the most recent crisis in Argentina in 2001. These crises
were all fueled by foreign financial intermediaries, yet the clean up was left to the IMF and
other multinationals. For an overview of the role of multinational organizations in resolving
these crises, see Martin Feldstein Economic and Financial Crises in Emerging Market
Economies: Overview of Prevention and Management, NBER Working Paper 8837,
(2002); Ngaire Woods Understanding Pathways Through Financial Crises and the Impact
of the IMF: An Introduction, 12 Global Governance, 373 (2006); Charlie Calomiris Capital
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sourced out to multilateral lending agencies—such as the IMF or the
EBRD—as has proven the case with CEE countries during the global
financial crisis.
The standard solution to this misalignment of costs and regulatory
jurisdiction is the centralization of regulatory powers. By creating a supranational regulator that undertakes to supervise financial groups operating
in more than one country it is presumed that regulation can be optimized.23
The tendency to attempt resolving conflicting regulatory objectives by way
of vertical integration is pervasive: Even if in general decentralized or local
policy spaces are preferred over centralization—as embodied, for example
in the subsidiarity principle of the Treaty on European Union— whenever
inter-community spillovers occur (that is in the case of externalities) a
move upwards in the hierarchy towards a federal or centralized solution is
advocated as the natural solution.24 Some properties of cross-border
finance are indeed akin to the externality problems associated with
environmental regulation: the classic case of externalities in search of
central solutions.25 As thus, the excessive ‘emission’ of finance into a
previously closed or less developed market can trigger a crisis. Similarly,
both parent banks and home regulators may have incentives to externalize
the costs of their actions to host countries.

Flows, Financial Crises and Public Policy, in Globalization, What's New? , (Michael M.
Weinstein ed., 2005).
23

For a summary of these frameworks and the application to environmental regulation,
corporate law, and banking regulation, see Richard L. Revesz Federalism and
Regulation: Extrapolating from the Analysis of Environmental Regulation in the United
States, 3 Journal of International Economic Law, 219 (2000).

24

See Robert P. Inman & Daniel L Rubinfeld Rethinking Federalism, 11 Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 43 (1997) for a summary and analysis of different federalism
theories.

25

See Revesz supra note 23.
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Still, some important qualifications should be made to the suggestion that
centralization is optimal in case of spillovers in the area under
investigation: First, unlike victims of polluters, recipients of cross-border
financial flows can exclude and regulate financial flows to their territory—
capital controls being the obvious solution and regulation a finer tuned
version thereof;26 Second, capital flows are in principle benign, thus
questioning the efficacy of standardized emission controls for the entire
policy space—Indeed, they tend to produce beneficial outcomes in the
country of destination if adequately regulated, and only when left
unchecked do they destabilize the recipient country’s financial system.
Whether or not this negative scenario occurs depends not simply on the
volume of capital channeled to a market of destination, the type of
investment (whether portfolio investment or foreign direct investment) or
the transmission channels used, but also on the effect capital flows will
have given pre-existing local conditions in the country of destination, or on
its “absorption capacity”27 —This mismatch problem between capital flows
and absorption capacity cannot be easily resolved by consolidating
regulatory authority with a central federal or global agent, which is unlikely
to have access to or be able to process of relevant information to make
the relevant judgment calls—Instead, a set of differentiated regulations
may be required that are tailored to capture different risks associated with
transnational financial intermediation: the risk to the intermediary itself and
the risk to the different domestic markets in which they operate;Third, the
centralization of regulatory tasks does not eliminate conflicts of interest or

26

There is a substantial literature that questions the efficacy of capital controls, although
much of it focuses capital outflows (or flights). However, there is also substantial
evidence that capital controls when judiciously applied can have beneficial effects. See
only Barry Eichengreen & David Leblang Capital Account Liberalization and Growth: Was
Mr. Mahathir Rights?, 8 International Journal of Finance and Economics, 205 (2003).

27

See Eswar Prasad et al. Foreign Capital and Economic Growth, 2007 Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 153 (2007) who develop this concept in trying to explain
patterns of global capital flows.
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fully internalize the costs of under- or over-regulation of financial markets.
Only if markets are fully integrated and the costs of market or regulatory
failure are equally distributed will that be the case. Absent such conditions
(and even in the relatively highly integrated European financial market
they are still absent), conflicts will have to be resolved either within a
single agency; or alternatively, among different de-centralized regulators.28
An additional benefit typically associated with centralization is the
avoidance of a race-to-the-bottom whereby several host countries in
competition with each other seek to attract foreign capital by lowering
regulatory standards. The race-to-the-bottom argument is often invoked in
policy debates, yet exit is much less common than often assumed and is
dependent on industry specifics.29 Races tend to be more common when
physical relocation is not required to reap the benefits of a more
accommodating regulatory regime and/or when relocation is cheap and
the new regulatory regime can be exported to the markets where the
company wishes to operate.30 Thus, in the United States federal legislation
providing that credit card companies chartered in any state could do
business throughout the entire federation under the rules of that state31
has triggered a race-to-the-bottom. Several states positioned themselves
to attract credit card companies by offering low regulatory standards (in
the form of usury laws, low disclosure requirements and the like) in all

28

An example for this is the consumer protection agency advocated by the Obama
administration as part of their reform proposal for the financial market. See the proposed
“Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009” available at www.treasury.gov.

29

Bruce G. Carruthers & Naomi R. Lamoreaux Regulatory Races: The Effect of
Jurisdictional Competition on Regulatory Standards (2009) discussing labor, financial and
environmental regulatory races within the United States.
30

Ibid at 29.

31

Samuel Isacharoff & Erin F. Delaney Credit Card Accountability, 73 The University of
Chicago Law Review, 157 (2006) on the National Bank Act of 1964 (12 USC § 85 (2000))
and subsequent acts of Congress, including the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branchising Efficiency Act (12 USC § 1811 (2000)) and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Pub
L No 106-102, 113 Stat 1338, 1999).
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states in which they operated and in doing so have effectively lowered the
safeguards for borrowers and consumers nationwide.32 This race-to-thebottom scenario has the specific feature of allowing parent banks to shop
for the state that offers the most convenient regulation and to use this
state’s set for banking operatives not only within said state, but in it’s
actions nationwide. In other words, it combines regulatory jurisdiction
based on domicile with universal jurisdiction. The European passport
accomplishes the same feat by allowing banks, insurance companies and
other financial intermediaries to operate across the European Union once
they have been authorized by a single regulator: The crucial difference
that sets the US example apart is that universal scope of a single
regulatory regime is conditioned on mutually agreed minimum regulatory
requirements. How important this difference is in practice depends on
whether the mutually agreed upon minimum regulatory standards
adequately address all relevant risks. To the extent they don’t, the same
regulatory race-to-the-bottom as described in the example of US credit
card agencies may ensue.
The combination of freedom to choose one’s domicile with universal
application of that domicile’s legal regime which is race-conducive should
be distinguished from cases where all competing jurisdictions have to offer
is access to their own markets. This makes a race-to-the-bottom scenario
much less likely, or at least less likely for bigger states, or states that offer
other comparative advantages that make them too big or too important for
transnational financial intermediaries to pass on.33 In contrast, smaller

32

Ibid.

33

China is the most obvious example. For a discussion of the concession Western banks
have been willing to make in order to enter the Chinese financial market, see Katharina
Pistor Banking Reforms and Bank Bail Outs in the Chinese Mirror, in China's Transition to
a Market Economy, (Joseph Stiglitz ed., China's Transition to a Market Economy, 2010
forthcoming).
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countries may lose out in the competition for global capital if they impose
host country regulations that are perceived to be overtly costly.
Transnational groups may decide to bypass them if they impose regulatory
burdens that are not worth the costs in light of the expected benefits these
markets have to offer. This, however, does not refute the notion of effectbased host regulation. Effect-based regulation gives host countries an
option to exercise regulatory jurisdiction in the event that their financial or
economic system might be inadvertently affected by a financial
intermediary’s actions, which they may choose to exercise or not. They
may even commit ex ante not to exercise this option. That act alone
should focus their minds on the fact that they are effectively relinquishing
the responsibility to safeguard their domestic financial systems and they
may therefore ask for some assurance vis-à-vis the intermediary or their
home country regulators in return.34 The home-host regulatory regime
accomplishes the same outcome, but without the awareness or the
political costs associated with an explicit abdication of regulatory power.
This analysis results in two conclusions: . First, centralization or vertical
integration is not a panacea for resolving conflicting interests between
home and host countries, customers and financial service providers, et
cetera. Second, the benefits of centralization do not necessarily outweigh
the costs of a decentralized system with partially overlapping jurisdictions
that pursue different regulatory goals. While standardization of regulation
may reduce the costs for firms ex ante, the total costs of incomplete ex
ante regulation and ex post bail out may far exceed these benefits,
moreover, such centralization tends to come at the expense of
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For a more detailed exposition of this point see Katharina Pistor Into the Void: The
Governance of Finance in Central and Eastern Europe (Gerard Roland ed., Reflections
on Transition Twenty Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall, 2010, forthcoming).
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information.35 Regulatory centralization is likely to reduce the collection
and processing of localized information thus exposing the system to the
vulnerabilities of local and unrecognized crises spreading throughout the
system; thus, any compromise between a fully integrated centralized
model and a more decentralized regime has to take into account that the
need to collect information locally and to assess its local and system-wide
implications will entail maintenance and coordination costs. As suggested
earlier, effective coordination requires ‘voice’ and this presupposes
leverage. The current home-host regulatory regime disarms host country
regulators. By contrast, effect-based regulation is meant to level the
playing field.
3. Towards Effect-Based Regulation
The deficiencies of the existing regulatory regime for global finance could
be counteracted by centralizing regulation at the global level, or,
alternatively, by devolving regulatory powers to (multiple) local agents.
This paper advocates the latter solution not only for political reasons but
also on grounds of efficacy: Within the EU a centralized regulator might
be feasible at some point in the future (although, interestingly, the global
crisis has not been sufficient to achieve consensus on this36), however, at
the global level such an arrangement is unlikely (and given the size and
diversity of global financial markets would be impractical). A centralized
regulator would face substantial challenges: it would have to regulate and
supervise a vast number of highly complex financial intermediaries that
offer a range of financial services across multiple and divergent markets.
Yet, effective regulation of financial intermediaries requires proximity to the
regulated entities and/or activities so as to facilitate the conduct of regular
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On this point see James C. Scott Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to
Improve the Human Conditions Have Failed (Yale University Press, 1998).
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See also the discussion of the new EU reform proposals under 4 below.
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audits, to sanction noncompliance, and to resolve looming crises before
they spread throughout the system. A centralized regulator would
therefore have to rely extensively on regulators in places where these
services are rendered. Rather than operating as an autonomous global
regulator, such an agency would instead need to coordinate the different
regulatory activities of national regulators. This kind of coordination may
well be needed, but it does not require shifting the regulatory and
supervisory powers to a central agent; to the contrary, such a reallocation
of oversight functions may well undermine the vigilance of local agents.
Neither could a centralized regulator replace cooperation among domestic
regulators. A quick response system is more effective if information is
shared directly by agents that have the means and the incentives to
respond with the appropriate level of urgency than if information has to
travel upwards to a central authority and commands have to be issued by
the center to local actors.37
The key challenge for effective regulation of global financial markets is to
ensure effective de-centralized regulation where this is possible and to
enhance cooperation among multiple regulators. The challenge in
designing such a system is the allocation of regulatory powers and
responsibilities among regulators in a way that internalizes the costs of
potential future financial crises, including crises that might originate within
their territory and those that may originate elsewhere. While it may not be
possible to fully optimize such a system, it does seem a feasible model for
improving upon what we have. An effective governance regime would
have to meet at least two conditions: First, it would need to better align
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This insight is well established in organizational theory. See for example Yingyi Qian et
al. Coordination and Experimentation in M-Form and U-Form Organizations, 114 Journal
of Political Economy, 366 (2006), who develop a formal model that suggests that
innovation is more likely in M-Form organizations that link decentralized actors directly to
one another, than in U-Form organizations, in which information and commands have to
be channeled through a centralized authority.
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regulatory responsibilities with the allocation of costs associated with
regulatory failure; and Second, it should enhance rather than reduce the
propensity for cooperation among regulators.
The current regime is deficient on both grounds: The allocation of
regulatory responsibilities between home and host country under Basel
Concordat and even more so under existing EU regulations largely does
not take full of account of the propensity for conflict between home and
host country regulators.38 The Basel Concordat—even in its most recent
iterations—works from the assumption that the core of financial activities
of a given intermediary take place in its home jurisdiction and that foreign
activities comprise only a small share of its activities and thus only
marginally affect the financial system of host countries. This explains the
strong emphasis on home country regulation—which has grown rather
than diminished over the past several years. However, the experience of
CEE countries (and others) during the credit boom and the subsequent
bust demonstrates that foreign markets have become critical growth
markets for banks from over-banked countries and that despite regulatory
efforts, foreign banks can come to dominate if not control entire domestic
financial systems. If anything, the European regulatory regime is even
more focused on home country regulation than the Basel Concordat. The
European
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Earlier versions of the Basel Concordat mention the potential for conflict, but over time
the role of home country regulators has been strengthened. The 1983 version talks about
“complementary and overlapping” regulatory responsibilities between home and host
country regulators. The 1992 version places the burden to challenge the proposed
division of labor, which favors home country regulation on the host country by stipulating
that “Inaction on the part of either authority will be construed as an acceptance of the
division of responsibilities established in the Concordat”. Thus, each authority is
responsible for making a deliberate choice between accepting its responsibilities under
the Concordat or initiating consultations on an alternative allocation of supervisory
responsibilities for the case at hand”, section 2 at page 4. The different versions are
available at www.bis.org.
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subsidiaries,39 which according to the Basel Concordat is a critical juncture
at which home and host country regulators can review the viability of a
financial intermediary’s ambitions for external expansion and establish
channels of communication among themselves. European directives even
provide for delegated supervision, wherein a host country fully delegates
financial supervision over foreign-owned subsidiaries on its territory to the
home country regulator of the parent; so far, however, not a single host
country has used this provision – much to the dismay of the financial
industry.40 However, EU hard and soft law emphasizes the lead role of
home country regulators in the case of consolidated regulation41; and the
EU home-host guidelines42 developed by the Committee of European
Bank Supervisors, or CEBS, in consultations with stakeholders from the
financial industry leave only a subordinate role for host country
regulators.43 Both the Basel Concordat and the relevant EU directives and
guidelines emphasize the need for coordination between home- and host-
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It requires only notification in case of a branch or when a foreign bank from another
member states extends financial services within its territory for the first time. See
Directive 2006/48/EC Relating to the “Taking up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit
Institutions” of 14 June 2006, OJ L177/1, 30.6.1006 (hereinafter Credit Institutions
Directive, DCI) Arts. 25.1 and 28.1, respectively.
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See the comment by the European Banking Federation (FBE) to the CEBS proposed
home-host guidelines laid down in Consultation Paper CP09: “In this context, the
delegation of tasks and responsibilities is central to the home/host framework. We
appreciate the emphasis on this in CP09. Article 52 (9) of Directive 2000/12/EC (Article
131 in the revised Directive) already provides for the delegation of supervisory
responsibilities. We are however concerned that this provision has never been utilised to
date. We therefore urge CEBS to explore the use of this provision to the fullest possible
extent under the new framework.” Available at http://www.c-ebs.org/getdoc/0d883044b483-4b45-a1f7-76b9e36b8b59/Responses-to-CP09.aspx.
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See Arts. 125, 126 and 129 DCI 2006.
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CEBS Guidelines on Supervisory Cooperation for Cross-Border Banking and
Investment Firm Groups, CEBS CP09, 8 July 2005, available at www.c-ebs.org
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Specifically, they are advised to seek other than essential information about foreign
subsidiaries operating on their territories primarily from home country supervisor. See
CP09 supra note 43 recital 45 at 15.
country regulator of the parent rather than the subsidiary or its parent. See CEBS HomeHost Guidelines supra note 43 recital 45 at 15.
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country regulators especially in times of crisis. Nonetheless, the described
(mis-)allocation of regulatory responsibilities creates the possibility for twoway free riding: Home country regulators can hope to escape the costs of
their regulatory failure if it materializes abroad, and

host country

regulators have few incentives to invest in adequate regulation if home
country regulators are given the lead and are presumed to take it.
To improve on the current regime it is useful to start with an analysis of the
costs of regulatory failure that materialize in a financial crisis. These costs
are born primarily by three constituencies: By the ordinary people in a
country affected by a financial crisis who lose their savings, jobs, etc.; by
the taxpayers in countries that have the resources to stabilize their own
financial system (and possibly those of other countries that might exert
spill-over effects); and by multilateral organizations such as the IMF which
help stabilize the financial systems of countries that lack the resources to
protect themselves and do not receive sufficient bilateral support.44
In light of this distribution of costs the allocation of regulatory jurisdiction
should emphasize not entities and their domiciles, but the location where
the positive and negative effects of financial services can be felt. Such an
approach is also better suited for the mercurial nature of financial services
and the risks associated with them. In the past, the failure of deposit taking
banks has been the major concern for regulators because of the systemic
effect such a failure might have on the market in which that bank is
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Note that the IMF finances itself not only from member contributions in the form of
special drawing rights, but also from interests charged on loans. Indeed, in the 1990s,
most of the revenue was generated from loans, implying that the countries at the
receiving end of IMF funding were financing the organizations. When countries chose to
pay back their loans to the IMF early and to avoid the IMF when in need of external
finance, the IMF was forced to lay off a significant part of its staff. See Ngaire Woods &
Domenico Lombardi Uneven patterns of governance: how developing countries are
represented in the IMF, 13 Review of International Political Economy, 480 (2006) for a
review of how developing countries are financing yet remain under-represented at the
IMF.
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located. However, the maturity transformation function that is at the heart
of banks’ inherent vulnerability to failure is shared by other entities that
face short-term claims but invest in long(er) term assets. The failure of
Bear Stearns and Lehmann in 2008 illustrates that non-deposit taking
institutions can face a ‘bank run,’ not only by their depositors but by their
short-term lenders-many of them fellow banks that participate in the interbank lending market. Fears of illiquidity and doubts about the viability of
available collateral can bring down a single participant in this interconnected market and fears about widespread illiquidity can topple the
entire system. Thus, risk exposure is determined not primarily by the
domicile of an entity but by a system’s exposure to systemic risk.45 It
follows accordingly that the entity-based regulatory model with its strong
bias in favor of home country regulation which was the inspiration for the
Basel Concordat and the EU regulatory regime is outdated.
The risk assessment and judgment call for an appropriate response to an
actual or perceived risk should be left with regulators that are accountable
to the constituencies46 that will bear the costs when the uncontained risk
materializes. While it is true that Iceland’s banks collapsed together with
their customers in the UK, the Austrian and Swedish banks weathered the
downturn of international credit markets by cutting back their exposure to
the markets in Central and Eastern Europe.47 Cutting their losses and
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Systemic risk refers to the propensity that a local event may trigger a domino-like effect
for an entire system. For a comprehensive account of the meaning of systemic risk see
Steven L. Schwarcz Systemic Risk, 97 Georgetown Law Journal, 193 (2008).

46

There is an extensive literature questioning the accountability of regulators. See only
George Stigler The Theory of Economic Regulation, Bell Journal of Economics, (1971).
Yet, unless one is of the view that this problem is inherent to any form of regulation, it is
secondary to the question of who should regulate. This paper focuses on the latter
question; the former will be addressed in future research.
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To be fair, they did this only after the true scale of the global economic crisis had been
exposed and at least some of them received bailout money from taxpayer with conditions
that prevented the use of these resources to stabilize foreign subsidiaries. At the
beginning of the unfolding crisis, foreign parent bank cross-subsidized subsidiaries in
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consolidating their business was sound business practice from their
perspective. Yet, the existence of national borders that separate their
policy space and scope of accountability from that of markets that
provided their banks with unprecedented growth opportunities allowed the
banks to externalize the costs of what proved to be unsustainable
expansion strategies. By the same token, their home regulators could
pride themselves in stabilizing their own banking system by ensuring that
they were adequately capitalized for their activities in the home market,
but left the clean-up job in Central and Eastern Europe to multilateral
organizations. In the words of the Austrian central bank, “in light of recent
rescue measure by the IMF and the EU Commission, extreme scenarios
[i.e. those that would have required further intervention by the ONB, the
author] have become much less likely”.48 This quotation illustrates two
related key problems in the existing regime: The misallocation of
regulatory responsibility and the lack of accountability for failure to
regulate in markets beyond the home regulator’s jurisdiction: The
regulators in Reykjavik, Stockholm and Vienna concerned themselves
primarily with the stability of the banks they regulated, but had little interest
in the stability of the markets in which their banks had come to play a
dominant role. It was only in response to the crisis that the Austrian
Central Bank launched an investigation into the lending practices of
Austrian banks in neighboring countries regarding the circumvention of
attempts by domestic regulators in those countries to fuel the credit boom.
Even then, the primary concern was legality of the banks’ actions (and
most where deemed legal, which they probably were) rather than stability
concerns with respect to the foreign market affected by the lending

Eastern Europe. See Ralph De Haas & Iman Van Lelyveld Internal Capital Markets and
Lending by Multinational Bank Subsidiaries, Journal of Financial Intermediation 19:1
(2010) 1-25.
48

See ONB supra note 15 at 9.
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boom.49 Instead, the countries that were affected by the strategies
financial intermediaries from Iceland, Austria or Sweden pursued in their
markets should have been responsible for taking actions to mitigate these
risks. After all, people in these countries are bearing the ultimate costs of a
financial crisis.
This calls for an effect-based allocation of regulatory responsibilities: a
domestic regulator should have jurisdiction over practices of financial
intermediaries that have a material affect on the stability of their home
market irrespective of the nature of the entity that undertakes these
actions (a bank or a non-bank); whether or not the entity is domiciled
within their jurisdiction; or whether the action is taken domestically or
abroad. Effect based jurisdiction should complement—not replace--entity based home-country regulation.
Two major objections can be raised against effect-based regulation in the
area of financial services. First, such a regulatory system would impose
excessive regulatory burden on globally active financial intermediaries and
thereby undermine the process of financial globalization. Second, it may
undermine rather than foster cooperation among regulators from different
countries. With respect to the first argument it would seem that the global
crisis has shifted the burden of proof to those who continue to advocate
the benefits of unfettered global capital flows subject primarily to entitybased self-regulation.50 Facing more than one regulator will increase the
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The shift in lending strategy often increased the risk for the recipient markets, as direct
loans tended to be denominated in Euros of Swiss francs rather than local currencies.
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This line of argument is most aggressively pursued by the Institute for International
Finance, a lobbying organization for multinational financial intermediaries. See IIF, Final
Report of the IIF Committee on Market Best Practices: Principles of Conduct and Best
Practice Recommendations 2008), which advocates self-regulation as the primary
response to the global crisis; and IIF, Restoring Confidence, Creating Resilience: An
Industry Perspective on the Future of International Financial Regulation and the Search
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transaction costs of multinational banks—however from a social welfare
perspective, benefits will come alongside these costs. The liberalization of
financial markets and the emergence of large, multinational intermediaries
in an increasingly competitive financial market where the search for higher
yields and thus greater risk has become a major driver of global
expansion, has contributed to the destabilization of many domestic
financial systems, and by implication to the global system. Increasing the
costs of global expansion could mitigate that risk. Moreover, allocating the
power to determine the extent to which domestic markets shall be
exposed to the risk associated with financial liberalization and greater
financial interdependence should be left with those who bear both the
costs and benefits of such decisions, i.e. with sovereign nation states. In a
world of mobile capital, financial intermediaries have the choice to enter
certain markets. Individual countries should have the choice to determine
on what grounds they might enter as they bear the costs for these
decisions. As noted previously, countries with big and potential growth
markets may have greater leverage, whereas countries with smaller
markets have less bargaining power. The latter might therefore face
greater risks, however, these risks do not translate into greater risk for the
entire system so long as their regulatory regime is denied universal
jurisdiction.
Regarding the need to ensure coordination among multiple regulators,
vesting multiple de-centralized regulators with regulatory powers and
responsibilities is likely to enhance cooperation among them over the
current state of affairs. Under the existing regime primary regulatory
jurisdiction lies with the regulator in whose jurisdiction a bank is licensed.
Both the Basel Concordat and EU directives call for coordination among

for Stability (2009), which takes a more nuanced approach in light of the depth and
spread of the crisis.
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home and host regulators, while at the same time singling out the home
regulator for taking the lead. This is also true for the proposed “colleges of
supervisors”51, which shall include home and host country regulators
under the leadership of the home country regulator. As suggested earlier,
this dilutes regulatory responsibility and invites free riding on presumed
regulatory vigilance by the other side.
In contrast, effect-based regulation recognizes that host and home country
regulators may have different, yet partly overlapping, regulatory objectives,
and at times conflicting ones. Centralizing regulation is appropriate when
multiple regulatory objectives can be aligned, or a social welfaremaximizing outcome can be identified ex ante that justifies giving higher
priority to one objective over another. In this case allocating regulatory
powers to more than one regulator would indeed lead to inefficient
duplications. In contrast, separation of regulatory functions is sensible if
and when regulatory objectives are in conflict with each other and it is
difficult to determine ex ante, whether pursuing one objective or the other
will be welfare-enhancing in the long term. The fact that regulatory
objectives may conflict and that it is difficult for lawmakers and regulators
to anticipate future contingencies strengthen the case for multiple
regulators with overlapping jurisdiction. This will at times entail additional
regulatory costs, as it is unlikely that regulators will reallocate regulatory
powers among themselves to achieve an efficient outcome. Such a
Coasian bargain52 faces political and legal constraints; moreover, absent
conditions that ensure efficient bargaining such an arrangement will not
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Colleges of supervisors are already referred to in Directive 2006/48/EC (see infra) and
re-appear in the draft Regulation for a European Banking Authority (COM(2009) 499
final); see ibid Art. 12.
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See Ronald H. Coase The Problem of Social Cost, 3 Journal of Law and Economics, 1
(1960).
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produce optimal regulation.53 However, this is not the only outcome that is
conceivable. Instead, regulators can and do coordinate provided they have
the right incentives to do so. Just as in a Coasian bargaining scenario this
requires that regulators have something to bargain over, that is, they have
both power and responsibility. In addition, a facilitator for regulatory
coordination that does not have a direct stake in the outcome may be
helpful.
An important example for coordinated regulation can be found in
European anti-trust law. European-wide anti-trust matters are vested with
the European Commission, however, cases that affect only member states
fall within their respective jurisdictions. In this area effect-based jurisdiction
is the default allocation of regulatory powers.54 Thus, anti-trust authorities
assert

regulatory

authorities

that

can

have

an

effect

on

the

competitiveness of their respective markets irrespective of where the
conduct occurred or where the entity that is engaging in such conduct is
located. The German Act against Restraints on Competition specifically
provides that it applies to all restraints of competition having an effect
within the territorial scope of the Act, even if they occur outside its
regulatory scope.55 Similarly, the UK Competition Act of 1998 prohibits
anticompetitive agreements, decision, and practices that “may affect trade
within the United Kingdom…if the agreement, decision or practice is, or is
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intended to be, implemented in the United Kingdom.”56 It is easy to
envision that a single case of misconduct can trigger regulatory responses
by more than one member state, and that such conduct may not only
violate the domestic law of individual member states but might also
constitute a violation of Arts. 81, 82 of the EU Treaty. In order to ensure
effective coordination of member-state conduct in the event that Treaty
provisions are violated, the EU has constituted a European Competition
Network with the task of coordinating enforcement actions by different
member states.57 The Council and the Commission that set forth the
principles of cooperation among competition authorities have issued a joint
statement58 acknowledging the co-existence of multiple competition
authorities whose autonomy and equal status are explicitly recognized.
The joint declaration strives to ensure the allocation of a case to a single
regulator that is best capable of dealing with it, but does not allocate
jurisdiction ex ante; moreover, it also recognizes that such consolidation is
not always feasible in which the different regulators commit to cooperate
with each other.
An important difference between the mentioned examples is that the
issues at hand for the most part are and can be resolved in an ex post
fashion, (i.e. after a case that might invoke multiple jurisdictions has
arisen). In contrast, financial market regulation to be effective needs to be
proactive, and when a crisis is imminent regulators need to have
measures in place that can be implemented quickly, as they will have little
time to coordinate at this stage. This calls for an early response system,
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The objectives of the ECN are set forth on its web site. See
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/more_details.html. See also Eleanor Fox Competition
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one that encourages the sharing of information by multiple regulators and
the coordination of measures aimed at preventing a crisis. The questions
to be addressed in the following section are whether such a system
already exists in the EU de lege lata, whether the reform proposals
currently under discussion contemplate such a system, and if not, whether
such a system anchored in effect-based regulation would be compatible
with the Treaty and/or existing secondary EU law.
4. Legality of Effect Based Regulation in the EU
The existing regulatory regime for financial intermediation is rooted in
Treaty provisions guaranteeing the free movement of services, including
financial services and the free movement of capital. Specifically, Art. 56
(Art. 49 TEC) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU59 prohibits
restrictions on the freedom to provide services within the Community, and
Art. 63 (Art. 56 TEC) outlaws all restrictions on the free movement of
capital not only among member states of the Community, but also vis-à-vis
third countries. While the scope of these Treaty provisions is broad, it is
not without limits. Member states retain the authority to regulate financial
services and capital flows for tax purposes, purposes of prudential
regulation, and to protect public policy (or common good) concerns.60 As
such, the Treaty provisions are therefore compatible with notions of effectbased regulation, as it can be regarded as but one assertion of member
state sovereignty to protect its public interests. Nonetheless, the scope of
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Specifically, Art. 58 (2) EU Treaty provides that member states are free “to take all
requisite measures to prevent infringements of national law and regulations, in particular
in the field of taxation and the prudential supervision of financial institutions, or to lay
down procedures for the declaration of capital movements for purposes of administrative
or statistical information, or to take measures which are justified on grounds of public
policy or public security.” In addition, Art. 60 opens the possibility that in emergency
cases member states may act unilaterally impose capital controls if the Council has not
taken relevant actions.
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member state regulatory autonomy has been curtailed by two factors:
First, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has over the years heightened
the standards for public policy defenses in an attempt to lend greater
credence to the principles of economic freedom enshrined in the Treaty of
Rome. Second, the EU has established a framework for regulating
financial

intermediaries

that

encompasses

directives

designed

to

harmonize regulatory standards as well as to coordinate mechanisms at
the European level in the form of EU-wide committees for ensuring the
specification of such standards for regulatory purposes and their
consistent implementation. Both trends effectively curtail member states’
abilities to resort to effect-based regulation other than in exceptional
circumstances or in areas not specifically covered by existing secondary
law. Reform proposals currently under discussion do not seek to reverse
these trends; rather, they are aimed at strengthening the centralization of
regulatory control at the European level with only nominal participation of
affected member states in the colleges of supervisors.
The European Court of Justice’s case law has long asserted that the four
freedoms embodied in the Treaty of Rome are directly applicable and do
not require the enactment of secondary legislation to be enforceable. A
requirement by a member state that a provider of financial services - in
this case an insurance provider - has to create an establishment in a
member state before being allowed to offer services there amounts,
according to the ECJ, to a violation of the free movement of services and
capital and can be justified only on grounds of common good.61 The Court
acknowledged that the growth of the insurance market, the mass selling of
products, and the difficulties customers encounter in deciphering products
and assessing their costs can justify regulatory interventions by host
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See Commission v. Germany, Case 205/84 of 4 December 1986, European Court
Reports 1986 page 03755, recitals 28, 29.
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states. However, such interventions must be proportionate—that is—the
host state must show that the rules of protection in the home state of the
insurance provider are not adequate and that the host country regulations
imposed are necessary in that respect.62 In assessing the level protection
provided in a given host state, the ECJ takes into account secondary
Community law aimed at standardizing minimum protection throughout the
Community. In 1984 the ECJ ruled with respect to the insurance sector,
that critical aspects of regulating the insurance sector, including technical
reserve requirements, were not yet harmonized, and that a case could be
made that such standards are critical for protecting consumers. A host
country may therefore fill this void and establish such requirements if it can
show that the insurance provider is not subject to similar requirements in
its home country.63 In the end, the court held that the requirement to
establish a full presence in a host state was not shown to have been
necessary to achieve these goals, but that the host country had less
onerous means at its disposal. By implication, the Court confirmed the
right of a member state to impose regulations if they can be justified on
common good grounds, particularly in cases where community law
remains incomplete.
In a more recent case, the ECJ had to rule on the legality of Germany
prohibiting a Swiss financial intermediary from offering Internet loans to
German customers.64 The Court first affirmed that such host country
restrictions on foreign financial intermediaries restrict the free movement
of capital and services. In the words of the ECJ:
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“It is settled case-law that all measures which prohibit, impede or render
less attractive the exercise of the freedom to provide services must be
regarded as restrictions of that freedom (…). If the requirement of
authorization constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide services,
the requirement of a permanent establishment is the very negation of that
freedom. For such a requirement to be accepted, it must be shown that it
constitutes a condition which is indispensable for attaining the objective
pursued.”65
In the end, the ECJ did not decide the question that would have been
critical for “Host’s Dilemma”, which is, whether a member state may invoke
the common good principle to constrain capital flows against the
background of secondary community legislation that has greatly expanded
in scope and level of protection. It argued that a Swiss firm could not
invoke the principle of free movement of services, as Switzerland is not a
member of the EU. While member states are obliged under the Treaty to
eliminate all constraints on the free movement of capital even vis-à-vis
third states (Art. 56) that provision did not help the Swiss firm, because the
Court argued that credit provisioning was at its core a financial service and
that any restriction on the free movement of capital was incidental to
regulating financial services.66 Nonetheless, the case is relevant in that it
affirms that regulations of financial intermediation by member states are
construed as a per se violation of the freedom of services. Member states
must show that such restrictions are indispensable for protecting the
common good.
Existing community law in the area of financial services affirms these
principles. Thus, the revised Directive on Credit Institutions (DCI 2006)
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Ibid, recital 46.
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Ibid, recital 49.
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obliges member states to ensure that the activities covered by the
directive “may be carried on within their territories (…) either by the
establishment of a branch or by way of provision of services by any credit
institution authorized and supervised by the competent authorities of
another Member State, provided that such activities are covered by the
authorization” (Art. 23). This and other directives67 that establish common
standards for the regulation and supervision of credit institutions form the
backdrop for this commitment. An entity that is properly authorized by its
home regulator based on the harmonized standards can freely operate
within the common economic space without facing additional regulatory
requirements by host countries. The scope of financial services covered
by this commitment is expansive. It covers financial services offered by
credit institutions, i.e. “undertakings whose business is to receive deposits
or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own
account”.68 Appendix I to the DCI 2006 lists 14 types of activities from
deposit taking over lending and financial leasing to custody services. By
implication, the regulatory regime, including the allocation of regulatory
powers between home and host country regulators set forth in the
directive is deemed applicable to credit institutions that provide these
services as long as they have been duly authorized by a regulator in one
of the member states in accordance with this and related directives
irrespective of where the actual services are rendered.
The directive allocates regulatory powers between home and host
countries as suggested by the hypothetical above: Credit institutions that
have been duly authorized by their home regulatory can open branches or
offer financial services to customers in other member states upon notifying
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In particular the Directive “On the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit
institutions”, of 14 June 2006 (recast) OJ L 177/201, 30 June 2006 (hereinafter Capital
Adequacy Directive).
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Art. 4 (1)(a) DCI (2006).
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host country regulators; they do not need approval from the host
regulatory. Host countries can seek to enforce violations of home country
regulation by reprimanding a financial intermediary and informing home
country regulators about any violations (Art. 30 (1) and (2)). In the event
that the home country regulator proves unresponsive, the host country
may take “appropriate measures to prevent or to punish further
irregularities and, in so far as is necessary, to prevent that credit institution
from initiating further transactions within its territory” (Art. 30 (3)).
Furthermore, the host country may “prevent or punish irregularities
committed within their territories which are contrary to the legal rules they
have adopted in the interests of the general good” (Art. 31). These
provisions recognize in principle that host countries can impose regulatory
supervision based on effect. However, the conditions triggering host
country regulation are limited to illegal acts of the financial intermediary
and do not include the power to counter activities that are legal but may
put the host country’s financial system at risk – such as the simple
expansion of credit that may, in the eyes of domestic regulators, fuel an
asset bubble. There is only one carve-out: host regulators retain “in
cooperation with the competent authorities of the home Member State for
the supervision of liquidity of the branches of credit institutions”.69 This has
made it possible for the UK Financial Service Authority (FSA) to announce
its intention to impose new liquidity standards on UK parents, UK
subsidiaries of foreign banks as well as foreign bank branches operating in
the UK.70 While this may open the way for other member state to follow
suit, this carve-out does not address cases of direct lending or other
activities not channeled through a branch or subsidiary. As noted above,
this entity-based approach fails to respond to changes in financial
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Art. 41 DCI (2006).
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See FSA proposed rules on strengthening liquidity standards available at
www.fsa.gov.uk.
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intermediation—in particular the increasing marketization of financial
services—which side-steps entities whether they be branches or
subsidiaries. Indeed, as it currently stands, the directive read in
conjunction with the freedom of services and capital flows appears to
preempt a more aggressive application of effect-based regulation. The
recitals to the directive emphasize that in the interest of developing
common standards for an integrated financial place the scope of the
directive should be broadly interpreted. Only specific activities or specific
kinds of operations not covered in the list of financial services covered in
the annex to the directive should be subject to supplementary national
legislation.71 In other words, DCI is the reference for EU-wide common
regulatory and supervisory standards: member states cannot simply
invoke their own prudential standards. The DCI even anticipates cases of
emergency, and in the event of the crisis calls for enhanced cooperation
between host and home country regulators,72 thus leaving little room for
argument that deviance from the established allocation of regulatory
responsibilities on public policy grounds should be possible in times of
crisis or in order to prevent one. The scope for effect-based extraterritorial
jurisdiction under existing EU law is therefore limited to financial
intermediaries and/or services not covered by DCI 2006 (or similar
directives on other financial services, such as insurance or securities).73
Since regulatory interventions against foreign financial intermediaries by
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See recital (6) in conjunction with recitals (4) and (5) to the DCI (2006).
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See Art. 130 DCI (2006): “When an emergency situation arises within a banking group
which potentially jeopardizes the stability of the financial system in any of the Member
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Existing case law that endorses the public policy exception for imposing national
standards on services conducted elsewhere predates the DCI (2000 and 2006). See, for
example, Alpine Invest, Case C-384/93 (ECJ reports 1995 I-01141), which was decided
solely on the basis of the Treaty provisions as the relevant actions predated EU directives
that might otherwise have been applicable. See ibid, recital 14.
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definition restrict access to the domestic markets any such measures
would have to be justified on public policy grounds and, as the case law of
the ECJ suggests, the threshold for such interventions is high.
Ongoing reforms of the European governance regime for financial services
do not follow the effect-based advocated here. Instead, they embrace the
increased centralization of regulatory functions in the hands of Europeanwide regulatory agents. A host of new draft regulation seek to establish a
“European System of Financial Supervisors” (ESFS) comprising of several
EU-level supervisors for different types of financial service, such as
banking, securities, insurance, etc. As part of this scheme, a new
“European Banking Authority” (EBA)74 will succeed the Committee of
European Bank Supervisors (CEBS). CEBS was established in 2004 as
part of the “Lamfalussy Process” for European financial services.75 The
basic idea of this process named after the chair of the “Committee of Wise
Men” that authored the report is that EU directives or regulation (level 1)
shall set forth the general framework for financial market governance.
Their implementation and enforcement by domestic legislatures and
regulators shall be guided by complementary guidelines developed by two
committees. At level 2, the European Banking Committee (EBC), and any
body run by the European Commission, shall facilitate the implementation
of directives by addressing political issues as well as design problems. At
level 3, CEBS brings together regulators from the member states involved
in the regulation of banks. CEBS was charged with providing technical
advice and ensuring the consistent implementation of the directive by
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See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
establishing a European Banking Authority, COM(2009) 499 final, Brussels, 23
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See also Commission adopted Decision 2004/5/EC of 5 November 2003 establishing
the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (1) as amended of 23 January 2009,
(2009/78/EC), OJ L 25/23, 29 January 2009.
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dispersed national regulators. During the first years of its existence CEBS
has devoted most attention to implementing the second Basel Accord
(Basel II), which is enshrined in the capital adequacy directive.76 In
addition to collecting information, conducing peer review, and involving the
financial industry through consultation processes, CEBS also functions as
a mediator in disputes between home and host country regulators; The
complexity of the process and the sheer size of the new committees (51
regulators from 27 countries are currently represented in CEBS) as well as
the lack of actual enforcement powers in the hands of CEBS leaves key
decision-making in the hands of domestic regulators: the regulator in the
jurisdiction where a credit institution has been authorized (licensed), i.e.
the home country regulator. A 2009 amendment of the Council decision
seeks to clarify the objectives of CEBS emphasizing once more its role in
ensuring cooperation among member state supervisors, facilitating the
exchange of information among them and operating as mediator in the
event of disputes.77 CEBS shall be governed by consensus, but if a
consensus cannot be reached decisions shall be taken by majority vote
with votes weighted according to relevant Treaty provisions.78 This implies
that large countries have more votes, which by definition puts most of the
new member states in CEE (with the exception of Poland) into minority
position, not only individually but also collectively. The specifics for the
relation between home and host country supervisors were established in
guidelines that CEBS adopted in 2005.79 The guidelines were open for
consultation, which are available from CEBS web page. The responses
came exclusively from banks and banking associations in old member
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states whose members include important trans-European financial
conglomerates.80 Not a single organization from the new member states
submitted a response – perhaps not surprisingly, because in 2005 most of
the new member states were relatively new, or in the case of Bulgaria and
Romania had not even become members. Nonetheless, The timing and
process of the adoption of these guidelines is indicative of the lack of real
voice of countries, which had already turned themselves into major
destinations of credit expansion from banking groups with seats in other
EU member states.81 While one might argue that most of these countries
would be unlikely to effectuate effect-based regulation should they receive
such powers, the existing governance structure gives them neither powers
nor responsibilities to participate in the allegedly coordinative governance
structure. Such an allocation of powers might be appropriate if the home
countries of parent banks commit to bail out financial systems of voiceless host states in the event of a crisis – a commitment hat home country
regulatory are unlikely to make.
The reforms triggered by the global financial crisis seek to strengthen EU
level supervisory bodies rather than national regulators in host countries.
According to the proposal CEBS will be re-named the “European Banking
Authority”82 and receive management structure more akin to a full blown
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Specifically, the following organizations commented on the guidelines: Association of
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regulatory agency with a supervisory board, a management board, a
fulltime chairperson, and a fulltime executive.83 The board of supervisors
consists of the chairperson (appointed by it), the head of national
supervisors of credit institutions, and one representative each of the
Commission, the European Central Banks (ECB), a newly created
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), and non-voting representatives
from each of the other two European Supervisory Authorities for securities
and insurance (Art. 25). The supervisory board is charged with realizing
the EBA’s mission, including the establishment of regulatory standards,
the

development

of

guidelines

and

recommendations

for

their

implementation, the consistent application of Community legislation, the
prevention of regulatory arbitrage, the coordination of tasks among
different regulators and the mediation of conflicts between them (Art. 6). It
decides with qualified majority applying weighted voting rights in
accordance with the EU Treaty. The management board has four
members in addition to the chairperson, all of whom are selected by the
board

of

supervisors.

The

management

board

is

charged

with

implementing the policies set forth by the supervisory board and meets at
least bi-annually and decides with simple majority of the members present.
Its two fulltime executives manage everyday affairs of the EBA – the
chairperson of the supervisory board who officially represents the EBA,
and the executive who performs day-to-day managerial functions.
A major function of the EBA is to ensure the consistent application of
Community law by national regulators.84 In particular, it may take direct
actions vis-à-vis national supervisors, but also vis-à-vis credit institutions
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in the event that Community law is not or inconsistently enforced.85 While
these measures create the impression that the EBA in conjunction with the
Commission might function as a supranational regulator, the new
regulatory structure is only as good as existing community law - including
the guidelines developed by the EBA, and its ability to keep pace with
market developments.
While the EBA now has the powers to step into the void should national
regulators neglect to regulate credit institutions within their jurisdiction,
their task is limited to enforcing existing Community law, determining
whether a crisis has arisen and directing national supervisors to take
actions in accordance with such law. Even in the event of a crisis the EBA
it is explicitly prevented from taking decisions that “impinge in any way on
the fiscal responsibility of Member States”.86 Given that emergencies
typically require bailouts of one sort or another that affect a country’s fiscal
responsibility, this is a substantial carve out. Last but not least, the efficacy
of this new agency will depend largely on its resources. According to the
EBA Regulation, the budget shall comprise of obligatory contributions from
national financial regulators, a subsidy from the Community, as well as
fees paid to the Authority.87
In sum, the EBA is more akin to a supranational regulator than CEBS. In
fact, the proposed regulation envisions that the EBA might be entrusted
with “exclusive supervisory powers” over entities and/or activities with
Community-wide reach.88 Yet, it falls short of the powers, including
enforcement powers, needed to effectively implement these tasks.
Moreover,

its

governance

85

Art. 6 (2) (d) (e) EBA Regulation.

86

Ibid, Art. 23.

87

Art. 48 EBA Regulation.

88

Art. 6 (3) EBA Regulation.

structure

40

arguable

entrenches

existing

imbalances between large and small countries, home and host countries
of financial intermediaries. While the chairperson and executives shall be
independent professionals, they too are appointed by the supervisory
board, where decision-making power is geared towards de facto home
countries. Last, but not least, the EBA Regulation further entrenches entity
based regulation and the system of home-host country division of
regulatory powers, which has been weakened by the greater marketization
of financial services. This structure does not bode well for resolving Host’s
Dilemma.
5. Concluding Comments
The existing framework in Europe for governing transnational finance is
insufficient for addressing the risks countries face that function as
destinations for expanding multinational financial groups-specifically the
kind of risks that have materialized in the global financial crisis. There is
remarkably little evidence that the crisis was caused or deepened because
of inconsistent application of community legislation. The key problem with
the existing regime is the misallocation of regulatory powers given the
distribution of risk and ultimately costs. Instead of addressing these
problems the reform proposals further entrench the ‘voice’89 of home
country regulators in EU institutions. What remains for host countries is
‘loyalty’ and the hope that their interests will be considered more carefully
in the future in light of the harm a systemic failure of their markets can
inflict on other member states and the Union.
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As Hirschman has argued, in integrated organizations members have only three
options: voice, exit or loyalty. When voice is denied and exit is not an option all that
remains is loyalty. See Albert O. Hirschman Exit, Voice, and Loyalty; Responses to
Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (1970).
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